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258 Ross V. CITY OF LONG t3EAC:tl [24 C.2d 
[L. A. No. 18674. In Bank. May 2, 1944.) 
EDNA E. ROSS et al., Respondents, v. CITY OF LONG 
BEACH, Appellant. 
[la-1c] Taxation - Exemptions - Property Used for School Pur-
poses.-Under Canst., art. XIII, § 1, exempting from taxation 
(1) property used exclusively for certain purposes, including 
public school purposes, and (2) property belonging to the 
United States and other governmental bodies, property rented 
or leased to a school district and used by the district exclu-
sively for public school purposes is exempt from taxation, not-
withstanding the fact that such property is owned by a private' 
individual and not by the district, as it is the use and not the, 
own~rship of the property in the possession of a school dis. 
trict that determines its status as property exempt from taxa-
tion. 
[2] Constitutional Law-Construction of Constitution-Language 
of Enactment.-Courts are no more at liberty to add provi-
sions to what is declared in the Constitution in definite lan-
guage, than they are to disregard existing express provisions 
of the Constitution. 
[3] Id.-Exemptions-Property Used for School Purposes.-The 
exemption from taxation of property used for public school 
purposes is not for the benefit of the private ",wner who may 
rent his property for said purpose, but for the advantage of 
the school district that may be compelled to rent property 
rather than to buy land and erect buildings thereon to be used 
for the maintenance of a school. 
[4] Landlord and Tenant-Rent-Implied Contract for Rent.-
In the ordinary course of business the occupancy of premises" 
by one person with the consent of the owner creates the rela-
tion of landlord and tenant, and in the absence of an under-
standing to the contrary, implies an agreement on the tenant's 
part to pay a reasonable rent for such occupation. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. John Gee Clark, Judge. Affirmed. 
[lJ See 24 CaI.Jur. 105; 26 R.C.L. 320. 
[2J See 5 CaI.Jur. 599; 11 Am.Jur. 678. 
[4J See 15 CaI.Jur. 713; 32 Am.Jur. 349. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3J Taxation, § 78; [2J Constitutional 
Law, § 29i (4] Landlord and Tenant, § 141. 
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Action to recover taxes paid under protest. Judgment for 
plaintiffs after overruling general demurrer to complaint, af· 
firmed. 
Irving M. Smith, City Attorney, and Joseph B. Lamb and 
Frank C. Charvat, Deputies City Attorney, for Appellant. 
J. H. 0 'Connor, County Counsel, and Q()rdon Boller, Dep-
uty County Counsel, as Amici Curiae on behalf of; Appellant. 
W. Ward Johnson and Frederic A. Shaffer for Respondent. 
CURTIS, J.-This- is an appeal from a judgment in favor 
of the plaintiffs after the overruling of a general demurrer 
to plaintiffs' complaint. The defendant was given time in 
which to answer the complaint, but failed to do so with the 
result that judgment was entered against it on January 15, 
1943, and the appeal now before us is from said judgment. 
The action was brought to recover taxes alleged to have 
been illegally levied upon real property belonging to plain-
tiffs and paid by them under protest. The property involved 
is certain property situated in the city of Long Beach and the 
improvements thereon. 
It is alleged in the complaint "that there is now, and at 
all times herein mentioned has been, located upon said real 
property a building, and the entire premises, both said re~l 
property and building, are now and at all times herein men-
tioned, and ever since February 28, 194~ have been exclu~ 
sively possessed and occupied by Long Beach City High 
,School District of Los Angeles County, California, and duro 
ing all such times said premises have been used exclusively 
as and for a public schooL" 
[1a] It is plaintiffs' contention that said property is ex· 
empt from taxation under the provisions of section 1 of ar-
ticle XIII of the Constitution of this state. Said section of 
the Constitution in part provides that "All property in the 
State except as otherwise in this Constitution provided, not 
exempt under the laws of the United States, shall be taxed 
'. ' .. The word 'property,' as used in this article and section, 
is hereby declared to include moneys, credits, bonds, stocks, 
dues, franchises, and all other matters and things, real, per-
sonal, and mixed, capable of private ownership; ... provided, 
that property used for free public libraries and free museums, 
',..,' 
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growing crops, property used exclusively for public schools. 
a.nd such as may belong to the United States, this State, or 
to any county, city and county, or municipal corporation 
within this State shall be exempt from taxation." (Italics 
ours.) 
It will be noted that under this section of the Constitution, 
property which is exempt from taxation is divided into two 
separate and distinct classes, that is, "property used exclu-
sively" for certain purposes including "public school pur-
poses," and property" as may belong to the United States," 
.and other governmental bodies. The contention is made and 
supported by some authorities that if property is in private 
ownership but rellted to a school district, and the district 
occupies it and is in physical possession of the whole of said 
property and nses it for school purposes and for no other 
purpose, still said property is not exempt under said consti-
tutional provision for the reason that it is owned by a pri-
vate individual, and by the owner rented or leased to the 
school district. To so construe the constitutional provision 
would tend to eliminate the main distinction between the two 
classes of property enumerated therein. In order to so con-
strue this provision of the Constitution it would be necessary 
to insert therein the words "which may belong to a school 
district" or words of similar import, so that the clause re-
specting property used for pUblic school purposes would read 
"'property which may belong to a school district and used 
exclusively for public school purposes." To insert these sug-
gested words into this section of the Constitution would give 
to it an added meaning not to be found in the definite lan-
guage of the section as adopted by the people. [2] "Courts 
are no more at liberty to add provisions to what is declared 
[in the Constitution] in definite language, than they are to 
disregard existing express provisions [of the Constitution]." 
(5 Cal.Jur. 599; People v. Oampbell, 138 Cal. 11, 15 [70 P. 
918].) 
[Ib]. As we read the section of the Constitution above 
quoted in part, we find nothing therein which is either un-
certain or' ambiguous or calls for construction or interpreta-
tion. It clearly provides that property which belongs to the 
United States, the state, county, city and county or munici-
pal corporation in the state, is exempt from taxation, and it 
just as clearly provides that property used exclusively for 
certain purposes including public schools, is also exempt from 
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taxation. This section of the Constitution was before this 
court in the case of Anderson-Oottonwood I. Dist. v. Kluk-. 
kert, 13 Ca1.2d 191, 192 [88 P.2d 685]. In that case this. 
court stated the problem in the following language: "Basic-
ally, the merits of the cause are determinable from 'a con-
sideration of the pertinent provisions that are contained \ 
within section 1 of article XIII of the Constitution of this 
state. Therein, it is provided that ' ... property used for free 
public libraries and free museums, growing crops, property 
used exclusively for public schools, and such as may belong to 
the United States, this state, or to any county, city and 
county, or municipal corporation within this state shall be 
exempt from taxation, ... ' (Italics added.)" It was there 
contended that this provision of the' Constitution in certain 
respects was' ambiguous and should be 'construed by the. court. 
In considering this contention the court following the deci-
sion in San Francisco v. McGovern, 28 Cal.App. 491[152 P. 
980] held: (p. 196) "We find ourselves unable to discover, 
from the language employed in the coristitution [art. XIII, 
sec. 1], any reason for interpretation, or ground for enter-
taining doubt as to its meaning. The language employed in 
classifying the property declared to be exempt :from taxation, 
it will be. noted, limits the exemption as to property used for 
free public libraries and free museums and property used 
for public schools, but the language following is-' and such 
(property) as may belong to the United States, this state, or 
to any county or municipal corporation within this state shall 
be exempt from taxation.' " 
"Where a law is plain and unambiguous, whether ii be ex-
pressed in general or limited terms, the legislature (orfram-
ers of a constitution) should be intended to me~ what they 
have plainly.expressed, and consequently,no room is left for 
construction. Possible or even probable meanings; when one 
is plainly declared in the instrument itself, the courts are .not. 
at liberty to search for elsewhere." (San Francisco v. Mc~: 
Govern, .28 Cal.App. 491, 499 [152 P. 980], quoting from 
State v. McGough, 118 Ala. 159 [24 So.395].)· 
It· is further suggested that the intent of the framers "of 
the Constitution, and of' the people in adopting. it, to ex-
empt from taxation property in private ownerShip and leased. 
t() a school district and used by the district exclusively for, 
public schools, is emphasized by reason of subsequent ena~t~ 
. . . ' , ;,. . .... , ".' 
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ments of said section of the Constitution without amendment, 
while similar constitutional exemptions were subsequently 
made respecting other and different classes of property and 
by such subsequent enactments it was expressly provided that 
no property so used which may be rented and the rent re-
ceived by the owner therefor shall be exempt from taxation. 
Section 1 of article XIII was in the original Constitution 
adopted in 1879. This section was readopted with certain 
amendments in 1894, 1910, and 1914, but the provision ex-
empting property used exclusively for public schools from 
taxation was retained without any change whatever. Sub-
sequently section Vh of article XIII, exempting church prop-
erty from taxation, was adopted in 1900, and section llha, 
exempting orphanages, was adopted in 1920. Each of these 
subsequently adopted sections expressly provides that no 
property "so used" which may be rented and the rent re-
ceived by the owner therefor shall be exempt from taxation. 
We may well infer from a consideration of these three sec-
tions of the Constitution, each providing for the exemption 
of a certain class of property, as two of them contain an ex-
press exception of property where rented and the owner 
thereof receives the rent, and the other of the three sections 
contains no such exception, that a different rule is to be ap-
plied in one case from that which would control in the other. 
In other words, by section 1 of article XIII property used 
exclusively for public school purposes is declared exempt from 
taxation, while under sections llh and llha church property 
and property used as an orphanage are declared exempt from 
taxation only when not rented from a private owner who re-
ceives rent for the use of his property. 
Evidently the framers of the Constitution in making the 
exception in favor of property used exclusively for public 
school purposes had in mind the great benefits derived from 
our educational institutions and desired to relieve them from 
the burden of taxation. The history of this state shows that 
it has been the steadfast policy of the people of the state to 
encourage in every possible way the cause of education. 
[3] The exemption of property used for public school pur-
poses is not for the benefit of the private owner who may rent 
his property for said purpose, but for the advantage of the 
school district that may be compelled to rent property rather 
than to buy land and erect buildings thereon to be used for 
the maintenance of its school. With this advantage the school 
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district is able to rent property for a lower rental than the 
owner of the same property would be willing to accept from 
a private individual, for the reason that if rented to a school 
district the owner is relieved from the payment of taxes 
thereon. On the other hand, if there is no exemption from 
taxation of property in private ownership but rented to a 
school . district and by it used exclusively for public school 
purposes, then a school district, when finding it necessary to 
rent property to be used in the work of maintaining its school, 
must compete with private persons and pay the same or higher 
rental than private persons would pay in order to secure 
property of the same kind and character. 
We conclude therefore that the property involved herein 
is property used exclusively for public school purposes and 
is thus exempt from taxation. In the consideration of the 
question now before us, we are assuming that the real prop-
erty of the plaintiffs has been rented or leased by them to the 
school district for a monetary consideration, and that the 
school district is not usin" the same free of rent. The com-
plaint is silent on this question, and we are controlled en-
tirely by the facts alleged therein. Of course, the plaintiffs 
would be in a much more advantageous position were they 
permitting the school district to use their property without 
the payment of rent. W ere that the situation between the 
parties, we would expect that fact to be set forth in the com-
plaint. Not being alleged, we assume that it does not exist. 
[4] Furthermore, in the ordinary course of business the oc-
cupancy of premises by one person with the consent of the 
owner creates the relation of landlord and tenant, and in the 
absence of an understanding to the contrary, implies an agree-
ment on the part of the tenant to pay a reasonable rent for 
such occupation. (32 Am.Jur. p. 349.) It is presumed that 
in business transactions between individuals the ordinary 
course of business has been followed. (Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 1963, subd. 20.) Weare making this situation clear, as we 
desire it to be definitely understood that our opinion in this 
case is not based on any assumption or on any uncertain sup-
position that the school district is in the possession and is 
enjoying the use of the property free of rent. 
[1c] Appellant and amici curiae take the position, rely-
ing principally upon certain decisions of other jurisdictions, 
that the property in question is not exempt from taXation 
Iii 
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for the reason that" as they construe said constitutional sec-
tion, it is not "used exclusively for public school purposes." 
They concede that the school district is in the exclusive physi-
cal possession of the entire property and is actually usi~g 
the whole thereof for public school purposes. However, they 
take the position that such possession and such use of the 
property' by the school district does not bring it within the 
terms of the Constitution declaring that property "used ex-
clusively for public school purposes" is exempt from taxa-
tion. They contend that there is a further and additional 
use of said property than that for which the school district 
uses it, and that is the use by the private owner who rents it 
for the purpose of deriving revenue therefrom. In this con-
tention they cite and claim that they are supported by the 
decisions of a number of courts of other jUdisdictions. (Trav-
elers' Ins. 00. v. Kent, 151 Ind. 349 [50 N.E. 562, 51 N.E. 
723] ; People v. Oity of Ohicago, 323 Ill. 68 [153 N.E. 725] ; 
Turnvere'in (( Lincoln" v. Board of Appeals, 358 Ill. 135 [192 
N.E. 780] ; State ex rel. Hammer v. Macgurn, 187 Mo. 238 
[86 S.W. 138, 2 Ann.Cas. 808] ; South Dakota Sigma Ohap-
ter House Assn. v. Clay Oounty, 65 S.D. 559 [276 N.W. 258] ; 
Norwegian Lutheran Ohurch v. Wooster, 176 Wash. 581 [30 
P.2d 381].) 
The cases from the Supreme Courts of South Dakota and 
Washington and Turnverein (( Lincoln" v. Bd. of Appeals from 
the Supreme Court of Illinois are easily distinguishable from 
the present case. The cases from the Supreme Courts of Mis-
souri and Indiana and People v. Oity of Ohicago from the Su-
preme Court of Illinois may be said to support the position of 
the appellant and amici curiae. As against these authorities 
the respondents cite the following cases which appear to be in 
point and sustain their position. (State v. Alabama Educa-
tional Foundation, 231 Ala. 11 [163 So. 527] and two prior 
decisions from the same state; Washburn Oollege v. Oounty 
of Shawnee, 8 Kan. 344; Scott v. Society of Russian Israel-
ites, 59 Neb. 571 [81 N.W. 624] ; Gerke v. Purcell,25 Ohio 
St. 229.) 
The opinion in the case of Washburn Oollege v. Oounty of 
Shawnee, supra, was written by Mr. Justice Brewer, who 
later became a member of the United States Supreme Court. 
We find the following paragraph from the opinjon, which 
we quote: (8 Kan. 349) " To bring this property within the 
terms of the section quoted it must be 'used exclusively for 
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literary and educational purposes.' This involves three things, 
first, that the property is used; second, that it is used for 
educational purposes; and third, that it is used for no other 
purpose. . . . Nor is ownership evidence of use. . . This is too 
plain to need either argument or illustration. If the framers 
of the constitution had intended to exempt all property be-
longing to literary and charitable institutions from taxation, 
the language employed would have been very different. They' 
would have used the simple, ordinary language for express-
ing such intention. The fact that they ignored 'ownership,' 
and made 'use' the test of exemption, shows clearly that they 
recognized the essential distinction between the two, and es-
tablished the latter rather than the former as the basis of 
exem ption. " 
In Scott v. Society of Russian Israelites, supra, it is con-
cisely stated: (59 Neb. 573) "To hold that a religious so-
ciety must be the absolute owner of the property occupied 
or used by it exclusively for church purposes to create the 
exemption would be to inject words into the constitution and 
statute which are not therein written. This we have no power 
to do." 
It thus appears that the authorities from other jurisdic-
tions are in conflict. To hold, however, with the appellant 
and follow the authorities cited by it and amici curiae, it 
would be necessary for us to construe the consitutional sec-
tion of our state as requiring property used by a school dis-
trict for public school purposes not only to be solely used by 
the district but also to be owned by the district before it 
would be exempt from taxation. As previously stated in this 
opinion, we are not able to so construe the applicable section 
of our Constitution. On the other hand, we are in accord 
with the decisions of thosfl 00urts in other jurisdictions, as 
well as in our own, which hold that it is the use and not the 
ownership of the property in the possession of a school dis-
trict and used by it for public school purposes that deter-
mines its status as property exempt from taxation. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., and Schauer, J., con-
curred. 
TRAYNOR, J., Dissenting.-It is the established rule in this 
state that no property shall be exempt from taxation unless 
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the Constitution clearly makes it exempt. Tax exemption pro-
visions are therefore strictly construed. (Cypress Lawn C eme-
tery Association v. San Francisco, 211 Cal. 387, 390 [295 P. 
813J ; San Francisco v. Pacific Telephone &; Telegraph Co., 166 
Cal. 244 [135 P. 971J ; Bay Cities Transportation Co. v. John-, 
son, 8 Cal.2d 706 [68 P.2d 710J.) It is to be noted t4at sec-
tion 1 of article Xln of the California Constitution does not 
exempt all property owned by a public school district, as it 
does property owned by the United States, the state, counties, 
and municipal corporations. The school property exempted is 
limited to that used exclusively for public schools. It is my 
opinion that in so wording the section, the framers of the' 
Constitution did not intend to accord greater tax exemption 
privileges to school districts than to the United States, the 
state, counties, and municipal corporations, and certainly did 
not intend to exempt from taxation privately owned prop-
erty. On the contrary, by setting apart school property from 
that of the other public bodies and making its exemption de-
pendent on its use for public schools, they intended to pro-
vide for the taxation of any property belonging to school 
districts but not used exclusively for public schools. 
The constitutional provisions relied upon by plaintiffs ex-
empt "property used exclusively for public schools." (Ital-
ics added.) The word "property" includes all of the inter-
ests and estates therein. There is a recognized distinction in 
the several interests that may exist in property, and this 
court has sanctioned their separate consideration for purposes 
of taxation. (Pacific Wharf &; $torage Co. v. County of Los 
Angeles, 180 Cal. 31 [179 P. 398J; San Pedro etc. R. R. Co. 
v. Los Angeles, 180 Cal. 18 [179 P. 393J; Central Manufac-
turing Dist. Inc. v. State Board of Equalization, 214 Cal. 
288 [5 P.2d 424J ; Graciosa Oil Co. v. Santa Barbara County, 
155 Cal. 140 [99 P. 483, 20 L.R.A.N.S. 211] ; Hammond Lum-
ber Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 104 Cal.App. 235 [285 
P. 896]; Hammond Lttmber Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 12 
Cal.App.2d 277 [55 P.2d 891].) It follows that the property 
is not tax exempt unless all interests in the property, includ-
ing the lessor's interest, are used exclusively for pUblic 
schools. Even if the interest of the lessee school district is 
used exclusively for public schools, it does not follow that the 
interest of the lessor who has rented his property for pri-
vate gain is so used. The lessor, like any other lessor of 
commercial property, uses his interest in the property, not' 
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for public schools, but for the ordinary commercial use ot 
producing income. (In re South Dakota Sigma Chapter 
House Assn. v. Clay County, 65 S.D. 559 [276 N.W. 258]; 
State ex rel. Hammer v. Macgurn, 187 Mo. 238 [86 S.W. 138, 
2 Ann.Cas. 808] ; Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. City of 
Wildwood, 118 Fla. 771 [160 So. 208] ; Travelers' Ins. Co. 
v. Kent, 151 Ind. 349 [50 N.E. 562, 51 N.E. 723] ; Spohn v. 
Stark, 197 Ind. 299 [150 N.E. 787] ; Norwegian Lutheran 
Church v. Wooster, 176 Wash. 581 [30 P.2d 381]; Laurent 
v. City of Muscatine, 59 Iowa 404 [13 N.W. 409] ; see Oar-
teret Academy v. State Board, 102 N.J.L. 525 [133 A. 886].) 
The-remova:l -of such property from the tax rolls serves only 
to increase the tax burden on other property to meet the costs 
of government that would otherwise be met by taxes on the 
exempted property. 
[L. A. No. 18763. In Bank. May 2, 1944.J 
PAUL METCALF et aI., Appellants, v. COUNTY OF LOS 
[1] 
[2] 
[3] 
, ANGELES, Respondent. 
Injunction - Other Remedies-Administrative Remedies.-A 
party aggrieved by the application of a statute or ordinance 
must invoke and exhaust the administrative remedies provided 
thereby before he may resort to the courts for relief. 
Municipal Corporations-Zoning Ordinances-Remedies-Ex-
hausting Extrajudicial Remedies.-An action to enjoin the 
enforcement of a zoning ordinance on the ground of its un-
constitutionality as applied to plaintiff's property will' not lie 
prior to the exhaustion of the procedure set forth therein 
whereby property mlLy be excepted from its restrictions. This 
is true even though the granting or denial of the exception 
rests in the discretion of a local board, and the application 
for an exception is an admission of, the constitutionality of 
the ordinance. 
Id.-Zoning Ordinances-Remedies-Effect of Denial of Ex-
ception.-The denial of an application to except property 
[1] Injunction against zoning ordinances, notes, 54 A.L.R. 366; 
129 A.L.R. 885. See, also, 12 Ca1.Jur. Ten-year Supp. 158. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Injunction, § 26; [2, 3] Municipal 
Corporations, § 160. 
